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H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact Jean Jacobson, room S7-035, extension 33710
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One issue dominating  recent discussions  on free  particular,  their statistics  suggest  that fears about
trade areas and other  minilateral  associations  how the further  spread of free trade areas will
(preferential  trade arrangemeats)  is whether  such  affect  world  trade volumes  may be exaggerated
arrangements  will detract  from furter  multilat-  - while  the dangers  of these blocs becoming
eral trade  liberalization  on a most-favored-nation  hostile  to each other  may have been  underesti-
basis. But for much of this debate  empirical  mated.
information  has been lacking  on:
Using  data recently  compiled  by the United
. The global importance  of minilateral  Nations,  Braga  and Yeats show  that the global
arrangements  that have  been, or are being,  importance  of minilateral  arrangements  is now
concluded.  far greater than is often  recognized.  Almost  half
of world  trade is affected  by these arangements.
* The  relative  size  of other  major  bilateral  trade
flows  not affected  by minilateral  amngements,  But major  trade flows not covered  by
and their  suitability  for  such  amTngements.  minilateral  arrangements  are dominated  by
important  county-specific  problems.  In particu-
. The global  importance  of Europe in this  lar, problems  relating  to high-technology  trade
process.  between  Asian newly industrialized  countries
(NICs),  Japan, and the United  States,  as well  as
* The possibility  that other  sorts of arrange-  between  Asian  NICs, Japan, and Westem
ments  - such as "managed"  trade initiatives  Europe,  are sufficiently  importanm  to hinder  the
(arrangements  specifying  quantitative  trade  formation  of additional  free  trade areas.  This
targets)  - are a more likely threat as far as trade  suggests  that fears about  the spread  of such
flows  not presently  covered  by free trade area  arrangements  may  have been exaggerated.
arrangements  are concerned.
Braga  and Yeat's tabulations  and analysis  of
Braga and Yeats  argue that this lack of  the "discriminatory"  trade barriers  applied  to
relevant  data has led to several  misconceptions  these flows  indicate  that "managed"  trade is a far
about  the movement  toward  minilateralism.  In  more likely outcome.
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Over  the last few  years many  analysts  have  expressed  concern  over the growing  dissatisfaction  with
multilateral  trade negotiations  (MTNs) as a means of achieving trade liberalization  (Aho and Aronson, 1986;
Patterson, 1989). One source  of this  dissatisfaction  has been  the pace of the GATT negotiations. The Tokyo  Round
lasted  seven years, from 1973  to 1979,  while the Uruguay  Round  started in 1986  and was scheduled  for completion
in 1990,  but the impasse  at the Brussels  Ministerial  Meeting  in December, 1990  led to its extension  - probably for
two years.  In contrast, the United States-Canada  free trade agreement  (FTA) was completed  in about 18 months
and the recently signed  Chile-Mexico  FTA was negotiated  in less than one year.'  Second,  the GATT multilateral
negotiations  involve very diverse interests of a large number of participating  countries - a  point that greatly
complicates  the agenda of the MTNs (15 different  negotiating  groups were originally  established  in the Uruguay
Round covering topics from services to tropical products). 2 A third problem concerns the GATT's de facto
consensus  rule which countries have used to block progress until their individual  demands  are met. 3
*  Economists, International  Trade Division, World Bank, Washington, D.C.  20433.  We would like to
acknowledge  comments  and suggestions  by R. Duncan,  J.M. Finger, B. Kaminski,  P. Meo , and V. Nehru. The
usual 'caveats' apply.
I  The perception that the minilateral  route is quicker than the multilateral  one, however, is not undisputed.
It is worth remembering  for instance, that  the road  to the single European  market  began  to be "carved"  almost four
decades  ago.  For a discussion  of this theme, see Bhagwati  (1992).
2  The groups reporting to the Trade Negotiating  Committee  during the first four years of the Uruguay  Round
were the following:  safeguards,  dispute  settlement,  agriculture, tropical  products,  natural resource-based  products,
textiles  and clothing,  tariffs, non-tariff  measures,  MTN agreements  and arrangements,  subsidies  and colmtervailing
measures, GA`IT articles, functioning  of the GATr system, trade related aspects of intellectual  property, trade-
related investment  measures, and services.
I  For example, India and a few other developing  countries blocked the adoption of recommendations  on
intellectual  property rights in the Ministerial  Declaration  at the Montreal midterm  review  of the GATI negotiations
in December  1988. According  to Hufbauer  and Schott  (1985)  the problem  of such "footdraggers"  has  become more
acute as GATT talks focus more on the negotiation  of trading rules rather than on reciprocal  trade liberalization.
Schott (1989)  argues that such problems  would be far less important  in bilateral  or minilateral  negotiations  among
"like-minded"  countries.2
Problems relating to the functioning  of the GATr  system itself have also contributed to the
dissatisfaction  with the MTN approach. One such set of concerns  involves the nature of the GATT rules and the
efficacy  of its enforcement  mechanisms. These criticisms  often center on the deficiencies  in the GATT Agreement
and its numerous exceptions  - most notably  in textiles  and clothing - while problems relating  to agriculture  and
subsidies  are not adequately  addressed. The proliferation  of so called 'grey area" measures  like "voluntary"  export
volume  and price restraints, orderly marketing  arrangements,  or intra-industry  agreements  - see GATT (1988) for
the details  on more than 200 such measures  imposed  by member  countries  - that run counter to tle spirit of GATr
regulations  has also caused  increased  dissatisfaction.
Given the importance  attached  to these  problems  there has been a growing  interest in "minilateral
arrangements" - particularly, free trade areas - either as an alternative or as a  compiement to the GATT
approach. 4 Proponents  of FTAs cite the advantages  of negotiating  with a limited number of countries that are
willing  to liberalize  trade bilaterally. The agenda in such negotiations  can be geared to the specific interests  of the
participants  and special  administrative  bodies  can be established,  as in the Israel and Canadian  agreements  with the
United States, to provide a consultation  and dispute settlement  mechanism "for members only".  Schott (1989)
suggests  that FTAs have also been  considered  as a way to achieve  specific  policy  objectives  such as managing  trade
deficits, reducing foreign barriers, e;;ninating the "free rider" problem in multilateral  negotiations,  balancing
bilateral trade flows, or even establishing  more favorable  conditions  for multilateral  agreements. While differing
I While he was US Secretary  of the Treasury,  James  Baker stated "If  possible,  we hope liberalization  will occur
in the Uruguay Round.  If not, we might be willing to explore a 'market liberalization  club" approach through
minilateral  arrangements  or a series of bilateral agreements.  In this fashion, North America can build steady
momentum  for more open and efficient  markets" (Baker 1988, p. 41).  It should be noted that the U.S. emphasis
has been on the establishment  of free trade areas and not customs  unions. The latter  involves  two or more countries
which abolish all, or nearly all, trade restrictions  among themselves  and set up a common  and uniform barrier
against outsiders.  The European Community  is an example  of this type of arrangement. Once the arrangement
expands  beyond trade in goods, encompassing  trade in services and the movement of factors of production, it is
referred to as a common  market - e.g.,  the 1992  European Single Market program.  In a free trade area, trade
among member countries is also completely  liberalized, or nearly so.  But there is not a common trade barrier
against  nonmember  countries;  each country  is free to impose  its own trade restrictions. The European  Free Trade
Association  EFTA is an example of this latter type of arrangement.  See Box 1 for a discussion of GATT
regulations concerning free trade areas.  The term  "minilateral  arrangement" will be used in this paper as
encompassing  any treaty negotiated  by two  or more  trading  partners, which  violates  the most-favored-nation  (MFN)
rule.  Unilateral  concessions  - such as the Generalized  Systems  of Preferences  (GSP)  of industrialized  countries,
as well as non-reciprocal contractual preferential arrangements  - such as the Lome Convention -,  are not
considered  as falling  under this definition.3
views  exist  on almost all these  issues the last point  has been particularly  contentious. Specifically,  many economists
- see Wonnacott  and Lutz (1989)  or Bhagwati  (1991) - apparently  see recent  activity  pertaining  to FTAs  as a threat
to the multilateral  approach since it channels  liberalization  efforts along alternative - and possibly conflicting  --
lines.
A  somowhat  surprising point is that the discussion  involving the relation between FTAs and
GATT's multilateral  process has been marked  by limited  empirical  analyses. In this paper we tabulate  and analyze
the implications  of statistics  on the global importance  of trade which now occurs under minilateral  arrangements
and compare  this with the major trade flows which still occur outside these  arrangements. Our analysis speaks to
two concerns. First, that the concerns  expressed  about a further spread of minilateral  arrangements  weakening  the
multilateral  negotiation  process  are at best tardy - these  arrangements  have already grown to the point that they are
larger than is generally  realized, i.e., they encompass  trade flows which are equivalent  to the ones that occur on
a MFN basis.  As such, we argue that the alarms now being raised are tantamount  to locking  the barn door after
the horse has escaped. Second, we also tabulate  the major  bilateral trade flows that are not covered  by FTAs in
an attempt to determine  if they are appropriate  candidates for such agreements,  or whether they are likely to be
subject to some alternative arrangement  like 'managed trade." 5 Our paper closes with an assessment  of our
findings  for post-Uruguay  Round trade relations,  highlighting  the issue  of 'high-tech' trade.  Before  proceeding  to
the empirical  analyses, it should be stressed  that this paper focuses on one of the major concerns often expressed
about FTAs - that  the further spread  of these  arrangements  may detract from or deter global  efforts to reduce trade
barriers in GAIT multilateral  negotiations. There are other related topics equally deserving of attention.  For
example, some developing  countries have attempted  to utilize  rtgional arrangements  to stimulate  industrialization
and growth - see the annex for a listing.  Such arrangements  may be relatively unimportant from a  global
prospective,  but can be of key importance  for the growth prospects  of the FTA member  developing  countries  since
they may have a negative  impact  on growth if they reduce access to more economically  efficient  outside suppliers.
5  The term managed trade is used here to characterize  arrangements  that specify quantitative  trade targets
(either for exports or imports).  'Voluntary export restraints' (VERs), "orderly marketing  agreements  (OMAs),
'voluntary import expansion' agreements  (VIEs)  - e.g., the US-Japan  Semiconductor  Trade Agreement  - and the
"multi-fibre  arrangement"  (MFA) are some of the main examples  in this contest.  For a review of alternative
definitions  of managed  trade see Tyson (1990) and Baldwm  (1990).4
GATT Rules Concerning  Free Trade Areas
The cornerstone  of the General  Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade is the nondiscrimination  or most-
favored-nation  (MFN) principle  of GATr Article I.  Trade concessions  awarded to one member  country are to be
extended  to all GATT members. FTAs conflict  with this principle.
In spite  of this  conflict,  GAIT rules can accommodate  the promotion  of trade liberalization  through
"closer  integration  between  the economies  of the countries  party to such agreements." GATT Article  XXIV  permits
departures  from the MFN obligation  provided  that the FTA or customs  union meets  three conditions:  (1) duties  and
other restrictive regulations  are eliminated  on 'substantially  all" trade between  partner countries; (2) the general
incidence  of duties and regulations  affecting  third parties is no higher after than it was before the establishment  of
an agreement;  and (3) the agreement  contains  a plan and schedule  for its complete  formation  within a reasonable
length  of time. Although  the intent of these  rules is sometimes  interpreted  as meaning  that an FTA should  be trade-
creating, there is no guarantee  that this will be the case.
Since 1948, more than 60 FTAs and preferential  trade agreements  have beer reviewed by the
GATT under Article XXIV  provisions  (see Schott, 1989, Annex A for a list).  Only four agreements  -- the  South
African-Rhodesian  Customs  Union  (1948); the Nicaragua-El  Salvador  Agreement  (1951); Nicaraguan  participation
in the Central American  Free Trade Area (1958); and the Caribbean  Community  and Common  Market (1973) -
were declared fully compatib!e  with Article XXIV requirements. However, no agreement  has been censured by
a working  group  as being incompatible  with GATT rules.  As a result of these precedents,  countries  are perceived
to be able to derogate from MFN obligations  in FTAs without regard to the effects on third countries.
This impression  has been reinforced  by the introduction  of the 1979  Decision  on Differential  and
More Favourable  Treatment, Reciprocity  and Fuller Participation of Developing  Countries (also known as the
Enabling Clause).  As a result of this decision, regional arrangements  involving  only developing  countries are
excluded  from the requirement  to meet the formal criteria of Article  XXIV. Regional  arrangements  among these
countries are permitted as long as they facilitate  trade, do not create "undue difficulties" for the trade of other
countries,  and do not act as an impediment  to the reduction  or elimination  of trade barriers  on a most-favored-nation
basis.  Formal procedures  have not been established  to ensure that these conditions  are met.5
A further key concern  is that some FTAs, like theEEC and NAFTA, may actually turn hostile to each other and
impose  new forms of trade barriers.
H.  Existing  and Potential  Arrangements
Existing  GATT  regulations  concerning  minilateral  arrangements  - particularly  Article  XXIV  whose
provisions are summarized  in Box 1 -- require notification  and review by contracting  parties of the General
Agreement. Since 1948, more than 60 niinilateral  arrangements  have been subject to this formnal  procedure.  A
compilation  of these reviews prepared  by Schott  (1989, Annex A) provided the starting  point for our analysib  of
global trade "affected"  (see definition  below) by these types of arrangements.f Next, an attempt was made to
include other similar arrangements  that had not been subject to the GATT review process (i.e.,  the countries
involved  may not have been GATT members)  and Inotai (1991) provided a useful source of information  on such
agreements  among developing  countries. 7
To this list we added the following  potential  new arrangements:  the North American  Free Trade
Agreement  (NAFTA),  and FTAs between  Eastern European countries  (including  the now "defunct' Soviet  Union)
and developed  Europe.  The US-Mexico  and Canada-Mexico  trade flows were considered  in anticipation  of an
agreement  being ratified in the next two years -- indeed, if it were not it would be a major blow to further FTA
negotiations  (and the concerns  about their spread  would  be alleviated). Arrangements  between  Eastern  and Western
Europe, in turn, have been considered  since in some cases these  negotiations  are at an advanced  stage and some
form of agreement  seems likely.  Indeed, Poland, Czechoslovakia,  and Hungary  have applied for associate  EEC
6  As mentioned  before, other types of arrangements,  like the GSP and the Lom6  Regime, were excluded  from
these tabulations  since they depart from the typical  FTA model  and only apply to one way trade, i.e., imports  by
the industrial  countries.  This exclusion  will impart  an upward bias to the residual  amount  of MFN trade in global
totals.
I  Developing  countries  hav. experimented  with inter-regional  trade preferences  from time-to-time. In the mid-
1970s, some 16 countries exchanged  mutual  trade preferences  under the provision  of GATT's Protocol for Trade
Relations Among Developing Countries.  In the 1980s, more than 60 developing countries exchanged trade
preferences, or established  an institutional  framework  to do so, under the aegis of UNCTAD's Global System of
Trade Preferences (GSTP  ) among developing  countries. Several, less ambitious,  attempts have also been made
like  the Tripartite  Arrangement  involving  India, Egypt and Yugoslavia.  Our tabulations  of FTA trade  excludes  these
arrangements,  largely because of their special  nature and the difficulties  in getting information  on the trade they
affect.membership,  and special deals have been approved (e.g., with Finland) or are pending with EFTA -nembers. 8
Furthermore, it is worth remembering  that, with reunification, the former German Democratic Republic was
absorbed into the European Community  -- a move that also provided duty free access for manufactured  goods
exported  to EFTA markets.
Recent  developments  in Latin America  such  as MERCOSUR  and  the Chile-Mexico  FTA  were not explicitly
accounted  for in our tabulations. 9 The MERCOSUR  process  is intended  to lead to the creation of a common  market
- encompassing  Argentina,  Brazil, Paraguay,  and Uruguay  - by the end of 1994. The Asuncion  Treaty, signed
in March 1991, established  this ambitious target based on the progress so far achieved in the context of the
Argentine-Brazilian  Integration  Program initiated  in 1986  (for a brief description  of this program see Primo Braga
(1990)).  The September  1991 treaty for a Chile-Mexico  FTA, in turn, established  a framework  for the gradual
reduction  of tariffs affecting  bilateral trade over the next four years. Accordingly,  90 percent of the goods traded
between Chile and Mexico are -xpected to be exchanged  under duty free status by the end of 1995.  A first
approximation  of the impact of these arrangements  can, however, be inferred from our data on LAIA 'affected"
intra-regional  trade (see Table 1).
We utilized  the 'affected' trade  concept  in our tabulations  due to a lack of precision  in some  export
and import statistics.  According to this concept, all trade that occurs between countries which are parties to a
minilateral  arrangement  is affected  (normally  in a positive  direction)  by the terms of the agreement. This simplified
procedure  does not allow for exclusions  and differential  treatment  by type of good that typically  exists under these
I  The estimate  of 'affected' trade flows between  Eastern Europe  and Developed  Europe should be interpreted
with care (see Table 1).  It assumes  that all trade between  the former European COMECON  member and high-
income European countries  would be covered by preferential  arrangements. Since - at least in the near future -
one should not expect such a broad array of FTAs, this assumption  tends to introduce an upward bias in the
estimate.  On the other hand, it can be argued that the use of 1988 trade flows inserts a downward  bias in this
figure.  After all, the trade potential  of Eastern European countries was significantly  hampered by the maze of
controls which characterized  their tm.'  2  relations  with the West at that time.
I  Other prospective  minilateral  agreements  in Latin America  and the Caribbean  appear to be in a formative
basis.  For example, in January 1991 both Mexico  and Venezuela  announced  their intention  to negotiate bilateral
free trade agreements  with several Central American  countries  by 1996; Colombia,  Mexico, and Venezuela  have
also signed  in 1991  a trilateral framework  for liberalization  of trade and investment  flows. There are also ongoing
attempts to revitalize CARICOM, CACM, and the Andean Pact, although the proliferation of new minilateral
arrangements  is adding to the stress of the 'old'  initiatives  -- particularly,  the Andean Pact.7
agreements. For example, some products  - like wood shingles  exported  from Canada to the United States  - are
excluded  from the Canadian-United  States FTA.  Similarly,  some developing  country  arrangements  (like ASEAN
or LAIA) ailow for preferential  tariffs below MFN rates instead of duty free trade.  Also, the degree of product
coverage varies significantly  among different agreements  -- e.g.,  only 40 percent of intra-regional  trade among
LAIA members was conducted  under preferential  terms by 1988.10
Data required  for measuring  the imuportance  of the existing  arrangements  were drawn from three
different sources.  UNCTAD  (1990, Appendix  Table Al) estimated total world exports for 1988 and other years
(as well as trade in broad classes  of goods like manufactures  or energy  products)  and these figures  formed  the base
for our analysis. This source also  provided  detailed  data on major trade flows such as the intra-trade  of EFTA and
EEC countries, trade between Europe and Japan, Japan and North America, etc. which greatly assisted our
tabulations of  'affected'  and non-affected  trade.  Second, Inotai (1991) compiled data on intra-trade among
developing  countries' existing regional  arrangements. In situations  where required data were not available from
either of these two sources (such as trade under the United States-Israel  FTA) it was compiled directly by the
authors from United Nations Series D Trade Tapes."
III.  The Relative  Importance  of Minilateral  Arrangements
Employing  these  three statistical  sources, Table 1 tabulates  information  on the relative importance
of exports that occur under existing minilateral  arrangements. The table shows the actual total value of 1988
"affected"  trade that occurs within the framework  of these arrangements  and each specific flow's share of world
trade.  Similar statistics  are given for (i) all non-energy  goods (i.e., excluding SITC 3) and (ii) manufactures. To
'°  It is worth emphasizing,  however, that if MERCOSUR  and other Flanned  FTA initiatives  - such as the
Chile-Mexico  FTA - evolve as planned, they will significantly  increase  the proportion of intra-regional  trade in
Latin America  which is exchanged  under preferential  terms.
"  There are some inconsistencies  between  the data sources  employed  in these  tabulations,  but it is anticipated
that their overall effects are relatively  small. Inotai employed  IMF (DOT) and OECD  statistics  for his tabulations
and these data may differ from United Nations trade statistics.  See Rozanski  and Yeats (1992) for a detailed
analysis  of the importance  of these  differences. Data published  in UNCTAD  (1990) are based on United Nations
trade data.8
assist in evaluating this information, separate sub-totals  are shown for arrangements involving mainly OECD
countries,  developing  countries, and Eastem Europe.
Perhaps the key point evident from the data in Table 1 concems the relative importance  of
European  integration  efforts  when  viewed  from a global  perspective. The preferential  trade of developed  (Western)
Europe  currently  accounts  for about $0.9 trillion  which is 31 percent  of world trade, or about 34 percent of global
manufactures  trade.' 2 Another  interesting  point is how the established  European  arrangements  (excluding  Eastern
Europe)  dwarf  current efforts  to form a North American  free trade area. At $195  billion  the intra-trade  of countries
trying to conclude  NAFTA (Mexico,  Canada  and the United  States)  is less than one-quarter  that of Europe. From
a global  perspective,  arrangements  between  developing  countries  are seen to be minuscule  - they account for about
three percent of world exports.
Overall,  the completed  arrangements  listed  in Table 1  encompassed  more than  40 percent of world
exports in 1988 and if we include the potential  new arrangements,  the share of 'affected" world trade would  be as
high as 46 percent (and approximately  50 percent for trade in manufactures). As such, the clear message  is that,
while the further spread  of regional  integration  efforts may threaten the multilateral  negotiations  process, a more
imposing  threat appears  to be the relative  size that these  arrangements  have already achieved  and the fact that they
could turn hostile to each other.  A further point to consider is that these established  arrangements  provide an
important  disincentive  for members  to engage  in multilateral  negotiations  which  would  lower the preference  margins
they receive  in each other's markets. (see Box 2).
Eastern  European  preferential  trade arrangements,  which  existed  until the collapse  of COMECON
(council  for Mutual Economic  Assistance)  in 1991,  are also reported  as a memo item in Table 1.  It is worth
12  A point often missed is that a  special protocol between the EC and EFTA allows duty free trade in
manufactured  goods between  members of these two blocks.  Trade in some agricultural  goods also occurs on a
preferential  basis between  EC and EFTA countries. The data in Table 1  have been prepared  to reflect these intra-
European  arrangements. It is also  worth  mentioning  that there  is currently  a draft treaty  proposing  the establishment
of an Europc  an Economic  Area.  Under  this treaty a number  of single market  ru!es would be extended  to EFTA
countries.  See Box 2 for a description  of some  of the major  dis,ncentives  that  preferential  intra-regional  trade creates
for European countries to participate  in multilateral  negotiations.9
TaAle  1:  Value and Share of Merchandise  World Trade Under  Minilateral  Arrangements
Share of 1988  Trade (%)  Value of 1988  Trade (Smnillion)
All Items  All Non-Oil  All  All Items  All Non-oil  All
Goods  Manufactures  Goods  Manufactures
TOTAL  WORLD  EXPORTS  100.00  100.00  100.00  2,829,098  2,562,252  1,980,066
OECD RELATED  ARRANGEMENTS  38.66  40.62  42.06  1,093,644  1,040,692  832,759
Intra/trade  of Dev. Europe  30.52  32.30  34.02  863,405  827,715  673,702
United  States  and Canada  5.32  5.49  5.20  150,391  140,562  103,028
EEC  Regional  Arrangements  2.05  1.98  1.96  57,976  50,853  38,803
EFTA and Turkey (a)  0.46  0.51  0.54  12,985  12,952  10,625
United  States  and Israel  0.19  0.21  0.24  5,507  5,449  4,730
Australia  and New Zealand  0.10  0.10  0.08  2,795  2,646  1,612
Australia  and Papua New  Guinea  0.02  0.02  0.01  585  515  259
DEVELOPING  COUNTRY  ARRANGEMENTS  2.74  3.13  3.13  77,619  80,320  61,918
Hong  Kong-China  1.27  1.40  1.64  36,012  35,995  32,427
ASEAN  0.80  1.06  0.95  22,648  27,191  18,783
LAIA  0.37  0.40  0.32  10,562  10,149  6,376
Gulf Cooperation  Council  0.16  0.16  0.13  4,650  4,170  2,560
Economic  Community  West Africa  0.05  0.04  0.03  1,513  953  650
Central  American  Common  Market  0.02  0.02  0.02  570  567  422
SADCC  0.02  0.01  0.01  537  375  210
Mahgreb  0.02  0.02  0.01  517  440  200
CARICOM  0.02  0.01  0.01  426  320  170
UDEAC  0.01  0.01  0.01  184  160  120
TOTAL  TRADE  FLOWS  UNDER
MINILATERAL  ARRANGEMENTS  41.40  43.75  45.18  1,171,263  1,121,012  894,677
POTENTIAL  NEW ARRANGEMENTS  4.42  4.11  4.07  124,911  105,338  80,666
United  States  and Mexico  1.54  1.54  1.56  43,460  39,449  30,934
Canada  and Mexico  0.05  0.05  0.05  1,439  1,388  1,002
Eastern  Europe  and Dev. Europe  2.83  2.52  2.46  80,012  64,501  48,730
TRADE  FLOWS  UNDER
POTENTLkL  AND EXISTING  ARRANGEMENTS  45.82  47.86  49.26  1,296,174  1,226,350  975,343
Memo  Item: Collapsed  Arrangements
4.87  4.16  3.67  137,879  106,644  72,749
Eastem Europe  Intra-Trade
Eastem Europe  and Cuba  4.47  3.78  3.45  126,459  96,775  68,357
0.40  0.39  0.22  11,420  9,869  4,392
Turkey  and EFTA signed  a free trade  agreement  in October  1991. This arrangement  was expected  to come into force in  .pril 1992.
Notes: Data compiled  from UNCTAD (1989 and 1990)  and Inotai (1991)  with some statistics  drawn directly form the United Nations  COMTRADE  data base.
Developed  Europe  and Cuba  were reporters  in the COMTRADE  base  and are the sources  for Eastem  European  data on these  trade flows. For some  of the developing
country  arrangements  (SADCC,  UJDEA,  etc.) manufacturs  and  non-oil  trade  values  were estimated  by applying  the share  of the-  goods in a previous  year to the 1988
trade totals.  The 1976 Bangkok  agreement  (Bangladesh,  India,  Republic  of Korea, Sri Lanka and Laos) was not included  because  at present  only 3 percent  of the
members'  intra-trade  is exchanged  under tariffpreferences.  The  above  tabulation  consider  the  exchange  of goods  between  EEC  member  states  to constitute  international
trade. If the EEC were assume  to be asngle  unit, the global share  of merchandise  trade  under existing  and potential  FrAs would  be about  31 percent.10
mentioning that  several  of  the former  socialist economies  are  negotiating new  FTAs  among  themselves  (e.g.,
Poland,  Czechoslovakia and Hungary) and/or with other countries (besides those in Developed Europe)."
Table 2 provides additional information relating to the point that the threat from the further spread
of  regional  arrangements  may  have been  exaggerated  (and  the  actual  importance  of  established  arrangements
overlooked).  The table identifies major bilateral trade flows not currently affected by existing arrangements (i.e.,
North America-Japan, North America-Developed Western Europe, Japan-Developed Western Europe, etc.) and also
indicates the 1988 value and global share of this exchange.  Similar  tabulations are also shown for trade in: (1) all
non-energy goods  and (2) manufactures.  As indicated,  the  13 major  'unaffected'  trade flows  listed in Table 2
(excluding developing countries'  inter-regional trade) account for 38 percent of world trade, but the first five flows
listed are  of  key  importance  as  they  comprise  over  two-thirds  of  this  total.  Clearly,  if  one  is  to  examine
implications of the further spread of regional arrangements for global negotiations and trading conditions these are
the flows upon which one should focus attention given their importance in world  trade.
Our individual analysis of these bilateral flows (see Table 3) suggests that, unless there are radical
and  unexpected  developments,  it is  unlikelv  that  FTA  arrangements  could  be  concluded  among  the  involved
countries.  For example, approximately $200 billion, or almost one-sixth of global unaffected trade,  occurs between
North America and Western Europe.  Disputes between the main trade actors (the United States and the European
Community) in these regions have been the main obstacles for a successful conclusion of  the Uruguay Round and
it is difficult to see how the points of contention (such as those relating to agricultural trade policy issues) could be
more easily resolved in an FTA as opposed to MTN negotiations (similar objections occur on other trade flows -
like Australia/New  Zealand and the EEC).  North America Japan,  and Japan-Western Europe, account for a further
one-fifth of the unaffected trade flows and it is again difficult to see how bilateral  FTA deals could be cut here.
In both markets Japan has been the objective of important discriminatory trade barriers (like VERS or antidumping
duties - see Laird and Yeats,  1991 for details) and the sense that Japan does not 'play  by the rules" has produced
13 The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone (BSECZ), for instance, intends to eliminate intra-regional  trade
restrictions.  Originally conceived in 1990, the BSECZ has been enlarged to accommodate several new states born
from the disintegration of the Soviet Union.  Its membership now includes: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria,
Georgia,  Greece,  Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey,  and Ukraine.11
some rather strident calls for further protective  measures. In these cases 'managed trade" appears to be a more
likely outcome  than a FTA arrangement  (see section IV which follows  for a discussion  of this point).
The possibility  of a minilateral  arrangement  between  Japan and other Asian countries, in turn,
cannot be dismissed as easily.  Actually, there have been recent proposals  - e.g.,  the concept of an East Asia
Economic  Group advanced  by the Malaysian  Prime Minister - supporting  such  an idea. We believe,  however, that
the export orientation  of the Asian  economies  tends to inhibit  the attractiveness  of any proposal  which would  entail
explicit discrimination  against outsiders  -- particularly,  the U.S. (see Table 3).
Among  the potential  FTA arrangements  falling  below the US$ 50 billion "cut-off' used for Table
3, there is - at least at the level of political rhetoric - one that has already began to be implemented:  an FTA
between  the United  States  and Latin American  countries  as suggested  by the Enterprise  for the Americas  Initiative.
It seems,  however,  that significant  negotiations  will only occur after the conclusion  of the NAFTA  negotiations  and
even  then there  are important  obstacles  to its implementation.  The main one hinges  on differences  in the levels and
character of protection  between  these countries; these differences  often vary directly with levels  of development.
For example,  Erzan and Yeats (1991) found  that less than 10  percent of exports from Bolivia,  Chile, Ecuador, Peru
or Venezuela  to he United  States faced  tariffs greater than 5 percent and, with the exception  of the MFA and some
agricultural  products, few nontariff  barriers were encountered.' 4 In contrast, U.S. exports to Latin America face
tariffs that average 15 to 50 percent in different  countries  and a large  number  of nontariff  measures. This evidence
suggests  that there would be implementation  difficulties  since FTA gains from a mercantilism  perspective  would
be skewed toward  the United States - the country  facing the highest trade barriers.' 5 Similar conclusions  apply
14  Many tariffs of less than 5 percent resulted  from general across-the-board  tariff cutting procedures  applied
in previous MTNs  and it is often suggested  that they have insignificant  trade effects. In fact, one proposal  in the
current multilateral  negotiations  termed  them "nuisance  tariffs"  and suggested  they  be dropped  automatically. The
relatively  low tariff barriers facing  Latin American  exports to the U.S. are due to several factors: tariff reductions
negotiated  in previous MTNs; existing  preference schemes like the GSP or CBI; and the concentration  of some
countries' exports  on raw materials  that  have traditionally  faced  zero or low  trade barriers. The Asian  NICs would
have a much higher incentive  to explore  PTA arrangements  due to the more restrictive  barriers they often face.
'5  It can be argued that this danger will be minimized  by the U.S. negotiating  strategy for the EAT,  which
seems to stress the need for Latin American  and Caribbean countries  to implement  significant  structural reforms
(including  trade liberalization)  before embarking  on PTA negotiations  with the U.S.  In any case, an FTA in the
Western Hemisphere will not be put in place in the near future.  For further details on Latin American and
Caribbean  countries reactions  to the EAI, see Primo Braga (1992).12
Box 2
'Fortress" Europe  and the Disincentive  for Global Negotiations
A key point that is often not adequately  recognized  is that FTAs create a disincentive  to engage
in global trade negotiations. Also, as a general rule, the more important  (globally)  the FTA, the stronger will be
the disincentive.  Since  our tabulations  (Table 1)  show that  FTAs (or related  arrangements)  now cover approximately
one-half of global trade it is  important to understand the nature of this force working against multilateral
negotiations. Institutional  arrangements  in Europe provide a useful example.
Three key arrangements  influence  the intra-trade  of industrial  Europe:
1.  Under the terms of the EC convention  trade between  member countries is barrier free -- while
nonrmember  countries  exporting  to the Community  face tariffs and, frequently,  nontariff  barriers.
2.  Similarly, EFTA provides for duty free trade among its members. Outside exporters to EFTA
face the tariff and NTBs of the individual  importing  country - a common  tariff does not exist as
in the case of the EC.
3.  A special  EC-EFTA  protocol  allows  duty free trade in manufactures  between  the two blocks and
also extends  favorable  terms to some agricultural  goods.
As a result, intra-European  trade occurs under very favorable  terms.  Sweden can now export
shoes to Denmark  under a tariff preference  of 25 to 30 percent. Finland  has textile  and clothing  exports to Norway
(thanks to the protective  umbrella of 25 to 50 percent tariffs and NTBs on outsiders),  while Greece exports wheat
to Germany thanks to variable import levies that have been estimated  at several hundred percent on Argentina,
Canada, Australia, the United States  and other 'efficient' producers.
Now, what would  happen to this intra-trade  if the European margins of preference were eroded
through  trade barrier reductions  negotiated  in MTNs. Clearly,  some trade - like Swedish  shoes or Finish  clothing  -
- would  be largely  eliminated  as domestic  producers  would  be placed  on an equal  footing  with more efficient  outside
suppliers. In other cases, trade flows, profits, and employment  in industries  that now enjoy major intra-European
preferences  would be sharply lower due to their greater  exposure  to outside  competition. In short, the industries,
workers and politicians  that would  be adversely  affected by such new competition  probably feel they have a major
stake  in seeing  that  EC-EFTA  external trade  barriers are not lowered  in any multilateral  negotiating  process. Major
European  losers - like consumers  who pay highly inflated  prices due to protection  - generally  are not adequately
informed about the added costs they bear and are not a very effective  political  force for reducing  trade barriers.TAble  2.  Ic  Relative  inyouance of Merd  ndis  Trade Fows not nfluenced  by RegonaTrade Aangemns  in 1988
Share of 1988  Wodd Trade  (%M  Value of 1988  Trade  ($milEon)
Trsde Fhrv
Items  G;oodsb  nflt  Titem  Ci2odb  mZaim  c
TCOrAL  WORLD  EKPORTS  100.00  100.00  100.00  2,829,098  2,562,252  1,980,066
Edatine and Potenti  FrA Trade Usd  in Tabk 1  45.82  47.86  49.26  1.296.174  1.2263S0  97
Cokloed  Arnnements  4.87  4.16  3.67  137.879  106.644  72.749
Maior Noi-PrefentialTrade  FTlws  38.29  38.94  41.72  1.03.45  997  261
North  America  - Developed  Erope  7.14  7.56  8.31  202,105  193,717  164,561
North  America  - Japan  4.94  5.35  5.90  139,846  137,091  116,890
North  America  - Deveoping South nd SE Asi  4.77  S.12  S.82  134,999  131,9  115,152
Japan- Dvelopuwg  Souh Ams  3.96  3.98  4.73  112,134  102,04,  93,683
Developed  Eurpc  - Developing  South  and SE Asia  3.46  3.52  4.47  97,856  90,303  88,498
lapan- Dveloped Europe  2.84  3.12  3.92  80,206  80,040  77,712
Developed  Europe-  Develping We  Aa  2.00  1.69  1.85  56,460  43,388  36,702  w
Developed  Europe  - Developin Afiica  2.44  2.04  1.81  68,935  52,27t  35,795
Deveoped  Eurpe- Devwlopg Amenic  1.86  1.92  1.39  52,729  49,126  27,465
Eastern  Europe  - Developing  Countries  2.01  1.86  1.37  S6,727  47,769  27,214
North Amrika - Develping Americea  1.62  1.47  1.21  46,014  37,587  23,906
Autraia/New  ealand  - Developed  Europe  0.61  0.64  0.52  17,216  16,510  10,238
lapan-Australa/New  Zedand  0.64  0.63  0.42  18,178  16,134  8,347
bot-Regional Develocine  Country  2.03  1.16  1.17  57,509  29,830  23,079
Total of Bilate  Plows  Lied  Above  88.98  90.96  94.65  2,517,458  2,330,940  1,874,255
1 Excludes  CBI(Caribbean  Bes  Initiative)  and CRIRCAN  (Canada's  Preferental Trade Scheme  for the Co_monwealth  Caribbean).
2 Although  a prefeential trade famework among  developng  conti  exists under UNCTAD's  Global  System  of Trade Preferences  (GSTP)  thi  systm has, ts  far, been lte  utilized.
Note: For convenience,  regional  groupg  adopted  we  thos employed  by the Statisd  Office  of the United  Nation.  See UNCTAD  (1990).14
to trade flows between  other developing  and industrial  countries (Erzan and Svedberg  (1989), for instance,  show
that sub-Saharan  countries face few important  trade barriers in industral country markets).
IV. The Mansd  Trade Alernative
While our assesment (Table 3) of the likelihood  of FTAs being negotiated for the major trade
flows currently 'unaffected'  was not positive, this does not suggest that multilateral disciplines  are, and will
continue  to be, binding  as far as these  flows are concerned. Drawing  on trade intervention  data for the U.S., Table
4  shows that a  high proportion of these major inter-regional trade flows 'unaffected" by  minilateral trade
arrangements  take place under "discriminatory"  trade barriers reflecting managed trade conditions  (particularly
VERs) and/or influenced by  'unfair trade" laws - particularly, countervailing  duties and antidumping  cases." 6
It is also clear from Table 4, that Japan is the main target of U.S. managed  trade initiatives. Specifically,  some
$68 billion of U.S. imports from Japan are subject to discriminatory  measures  - this is more than 13 times the
combined  imports from Germany, France and the U.K.
As Table 4 suggests, managed trade has a  major role in shaping current international  trade
relations.  One should not infer from this data 'that nles  do not work and more managed  trade must, therefore,
be the way to go'  (Bhagwati  (1991, p.23).  But an eventual failure, or less than  satisfactory  outcome, of the
Uruguay  Round would advance the cause of those who believe that a fix-quantity  trading regime is an inevitable
development. This could not only impede the rollback of the large array of already existing  discrminatory trade
barriers, but also foster their use in areas characterized  by significant  trade dynamism  (e.g., high-tech  trade).
Advocates of managed trade have used different rationales to justify govemment intervention.
These "rationales,"  as far as motivations  are concerned,  can be classified  as follows:  macroeconomic,  systemic,  and
16 The NTBs Listed  in Table 4 are discriminatory  in that they are directed against anecific  countries whereas
other measures, like global quotas or variable import levies, do not differentiate  among foreign suppliers.  As
indicated,  the U.S. discriminatory  measures  are very heavily  concentrated  on Japan  - particularly  Japanese  exports
of high technology  products. The authors  have undertaken  a separate  analysis of EEC discriminatory  trade barriers
and also found  that these restrictions  are primarily  directed  at Japan (results available  from the authors on request).
With Canada, United States, and Sweden as the combined compartor group our results indicated that over 90
percent of EEC discriminatory  protection  was directed  against Japanese  exports. Laird and Yeats (1991) provide
additional  information  on the application  of NTBs by major trading nations.Table 3.  Obrvations  on Poential FA  Arangement Between  Specific  Trding Pamrn  (Unaffcted trade flows  over $50 billion)
Share of totl
xpot  goaing  to
TIsde  thm  d  ae  o  (S)  1988  Vaue of  Share  of aFl  FrA
1970  1988  co(Smni1.)  unaffeced  trade  p
North America  and Debve  d EAope  - - 202,105  14.5  An  unlikel aragemt.  be  current  MTNs  salled due North Ameica's expots to Europe  29(43)  21(33)  90,174  6.5  to diputes btween dkes paties and  there s no Eupe's  expots to Noth Ameica  9()  7(31)  111,931  8.0  indicaion  they  would  be easier  to addrmes  biaeray.
Eurp  now weem  preoccupied  wth the single  MArket
Initiaive  and related  problem.
North Ameica and Jemu  - - 139.846  10.0  Wide U.S. deficits  andempts  to band Japn an North Awrica's  expor  to Japan  9(14)  10(16)  43,162  3.1  unfair'  ading  patner make  this combinaton  unEkely  - Japan's export to Nordh  Amenca  34  37  96,684  6.9  as do the large number  of discnimin  y NTBs  applied  to
Japan. A mor  libly outcome  is managed  trade.
Nordh  America  and Develoing South  and SE Asia  - - 134,  9.7  Persistent  U.S. deficits  with South  and SE Asia, as we1 North Amrica's expots to South  Asia  7(10)  11(17)  47,446  3.4  as the ltr's  concentrati  of exports  in 'swnitive' Developing  South  Asia's  etpo  to Japan  25(31)  29(37)  87,5S3  6.3  sectors  make  this aagement  diiEcult. U.S.
discrimtory  proteci  also targets  SE Asian  NICs.
Japan and Develoing Soulh  and SE Asia  - - 112.134  8.0  Developing  Aia's  reliance  on the U.S. export  market Japan's  exots  to South  Al  25  25  67,109  4.8  makes  thi combinatin unlikely,  not to  ntion  Worid Developing  South  Aa's  expos  to Japan  17(21)  15(19)  45,025  3.2  War n memories. Alo,  Yeats (1991)  sow  that
Developing  South  ad  SE Asia countws have  very
simir  Comparative  advant  profiks - a point that
would  make an FIA diffwcult.
Devehloed  Eumre and Developing  Soh  and SE Asia  - - 97.856  7.0  South  Asia's reliance  on the North  American  market  all Developed  Europe's  xports  to Souh Asia  3(7)  4(13)  46,316  3.3  but precluds tisa  ment. SE Asian  NICs are  oflen Developing  South  Asia's  exports  to Euope  19(24)  17  51,540  3.7  taere by discrminaty  Eumpean  tade bariers.
Jaman  and Develoged  Euro e  - - 80.206  5.8  Distance  is a negative  factor  as is Japan's  export Japas  expos to Europe  15  21  55,736  4.0  concentration  in sensiive  sectors.  he fict that Japan's Developed  Europe's export to Japn  1(4)  2(7)  24,470  1.8  North  Amercan exports  are nealy twice  great as those
to Europe  makes  this arra  em  .
Devetoed Europe  and Devewoine  Africa  - - 68.93S  5.0  Vat differences  in industrialization vels make  thae Developed  Europe's  exports  to Africa  5(14)  3(10)  37,614  2.7  combinations  very  nlikely. There are few setors where Deveoping  Afica's expots to Eurpe  68(72)  59(63)  31,321  2.3  Aiaindury  could  compete  with Eumope.
Estern Euroe  and Developing  Counies  - - 56.727  4.1  Major  Etern  European  internal  probleo,  plu  a ack of EAstem  Europe's  exports  to Developing  Countries  13(34)  17(37)  37,479  2.7  expeiience  in market-oriened  relation with developing Developing  couni  expors to Eaten  Europe  6(7)  3(5)  19,248  1.4  counries, makes  agremet  her  vey unlikel.
Developed  Europe  and Developing  West Asia  - - 56,460  4.1  Industrialization  level  and cultural  differences  make major Develped Eupe's  exports  to Asia  2(7)  3(10)  36,631  2.6  FA  ageements  here unlikely.
Deeloping  West Ada's  export  to Europe  44(47)  23(27)  19,829  1.5
Develoced  Europe  and Develoina Americas  - - 52.729  3.8  Developing  Amerca's reliance  on the U.S. market  all but Developed  Europe's  expors to Amricas  4(12)  2(7)  28,337  2.0  precde  these  arrangements.  Alo,  industrialization Developing  Amerca's exports  to Europe  32(39)  23(27)  24,392  1.8  level differenes ae  a major  negative  factor.
Fgues  in parenthes  exclude  the exporting  region's intrratradc.16
sectoral (or microeconomic).  Although,  the use of managed  trade to pursue macroeconomic  objectives  does not
find many supporters  among  economists,  still, the deterioration  of the US current account  over the 1980s  has led
to several  proposals  - usually,  focusing  on the US-Japan  bilateral  imbalance  - in favor  of quantitative  trade targets
(US  House of Representatives  1986;  Kissinger  and Vance 1988;  Prestowitz  1988;  Dombusch,  Krugman,  and Park
1989). Managed  trade  is presented  in most of these  proposals  as an instument to force  U.S. trade  partners  to open
their markets.  The limitations  of this approach  to 'correct'  US current account  deficits are well known, yet,
supporters  claim that the increase  in demand  for US goods would tend to ease, via a terms-of-trade  effect, the
impact  of a fiscal-induced  real income  adjustment.
A 'systemic"  rationale  in favor  of managed  trade,  in turn,  has been  developed  by those concerned
with the sow-called  Japan question' (Bhagwati  1991).  According  to this perspective  - e.g., Fallows (1989)  -
Japanese  policies  reveal  a social  (cultural  ...) preference  for a fix-quantity  trade  regime  instead  of a rles-oriented
regime. Therefore,  the only  way to  effectively  negotiate  the opening  of the Japaniese  economy  would  ba by adopting
managed  trade  practices. This  rationale  is based  on the thesis  that  Japan  is an outlier  among  trading  nations  - moro
precisely,  that Japan is a relatively  closed  economy. To the oxtent  that the auacy  of this proposition  remuins
open to debate,  the economic  relevance  of the systemic  argument  is also questionable. 11
Sectoral  (or microeconomic)  rationales,  although  equally  controvesial,  have provided the most
popular  arguments  used to support  managed  trade initiatives. In the past, these  initiatives  were often framed as
defensive  actions to ease the adjustment  of mature  industries  in the industrialized  countries (e.g., the MPA).
Accusations  of unfair  trade  practices  by dynamic  exporters  were also  a common  characteristic  of defensive  managed
trade policies  (e.g., steel VRAs  negotiated  by the US and the EC with Japan  and several  NICs). More recently,
however, the demand for managed trade has become increasingly  associated  with the aspiration to promote
'strategic' industries  in order to foster  national  competitiveness  (Tyson 1990). This  development,  in par,  reflects
the perception that Japan has successfully  targeted 'strategic' industries."  This perception,  reinforced by the
17  Lawrence  (1987),  Balassa  and  Noland  (1988),  and  Dornbusch  (1990),  for instance,  argue that  Japan  is - vis-
a-vis other OECD  countries  - a closed  economy. Saxonhouse  (1985)  and Bhagwati  (1991),  in turn, dispute  this
conclusion. For a review  of the related  literature  see Takeuchi  (1988)  and Srinivasan  (1991).
"S  There is no consensus  on the precise  meaning  of the term 'strategic industry.' Most  of the contributions  in
this area tend to list high  sunk  costs  in R&D, 'positive  extrnalities, large  economies  of scale  based  on learning  by
doing, and important  upstream  and downstream  linkages' (Michalski  1991,  p. 9) among  the typical attributes  of
strategic  industries. As Stevens  (1991, p. 98)  points  out, however,  the fiudamental  issue  here  is 'the fact  that  many
governments  [in spite  of the non-existence  of an accepted  working  definition]  are able to  identify  what they  perceive
to be 'strategic' industries  and ale willing  to promote  them with  specific  policies.'17
economic  success  of a few followers  of the Japanese-paradigm  -- e.g., Republic  of Korea -- has given a new appeal
to interventionist  trade and industrial  policies as far as policymakers  are concemed. At the same time, a flurry of
theoretical contributions in the context of the so-called "strategic trade theory" have seemingly given a new
"respectability"  to interventionist  policies.' 9
In this paper, we simply  argue that  the major  "unaffected"  trade flows  identified  in Table 2 provide
fertile ground  for further  managed  trade  initiatives. Our analysis  reflects  the following  considerations:  (i) currently,
high-technology  industries  are the preferred choice for those who support the "strategic  industry"  argument -- see
Box 3 for a discussion  of definitions  for high-tech  industry  and trade; (ii) the relative  importance  of high-tech  trade
vis-a-vis  global trade flows has increased  significantly  over the last three decades  from about 10 percent in 1965
to 22 percent of world trade in 1989w;  (iii)  the United States  is perceived  to be losing  comp'-titiveness  in high-tech
sectors; 2"  (iv) and Japan has assumed  a commanding  position in high-tech  trade.  As Table 5 shows the United
States ran a $24 billion trade deficit in high technology  trade with Japan in 1989  (the EEC deficit with Japan was
$19 billion) and these products were often the focus of U.S. discriminatory  trade restrictions against Japan.
Growing  U.S. trade deficits in high-tech  trade vis-a-vis  Japan and the Asian NICs, together  with
the perception  that their success  has been fostered  by government  intervention,  is an additional  factor eroding  U.S.
support for the a non-interventionist  approach with respect to high-tech  industries.  In the EC, the search for
European "champions"  in high-tech  sectors  provides another likely source of additional mnanaged  trade initiatives
against not only East Asian firms, but also U.S. companies.'  There is also a growing recognition  that existing
multilateral trade  disciplines are  not  sufficient to  avoid international trade  frictions in  high-tech sectors.
Accordingly,  there have been proposals  for drafting  a code  for innovation  policies  - encompassing  trade, research
19 For a review of the strategic trade theory see, for instance, Krugman  (1987) and Helpman (1989).  For
critical analyses  see, for instance,  Dixit (1987), Bhagwati  (1989) and Haberler (1990).
20 See the Appendix  for detailed  statistics  on trade in high-tech  products.
21  Revealed  comparative  advantage  indices for high-tech  trade do not confirm this perception for the 1968-88
period. Yet, the significant  increase  in competitiveness  of Japan and some NICs in terms of high-tech  trade in the
same period  - see Appendix Table 5 -- may explain  the perception of relative ITS decline.
22  See, for instance,  Koopmann  and Scharrer (1990).18
Tahle 4.  The Incidence of Discriminacory U.S.  Trade Barriers on Japan,  Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom and French  Exports,
(Trade values nre for  1986 and trade barriers are those in place in  1990)
Fed. Republic of  Affected Trade of all
Japan  Germany  United Kingdom  France  Four  Countries
NTB  Tariff  Value  Tariff  Value  Tariff  Value  Tariff  Value  Value  Japan's
CoJe  Description  Lines  ($mill.)  Lines  (Smill.)  Lines  (Smill.)  Lines  ($mill.)  (Smill.)  Share  %
11  72  Retaliatory duties  3  1,429  7  30  6  4  7  6  1,496  97.3
2510  Anti-dumping duties  83  6,297  16  872  6  473  19  419  8,061  78.1
2520  Countervailing duties  2  139  1  8  4  10  3  11  168  82.7
3230  Quota  allocated by country  16  70  7  32  11  10  11  40  152  46.1
3410  Voluntary export restraint  106  27,676  105  810  98  270  93  496  29,252  94.6
3500  MFA restraint  agreement  489  1,163  0  0  0  0  0  0  489  100.0
4220  Impot  monitoring  3  942  4  358  1  - 0  0  1,300  72.5
6310  Anti-dumping investigations  29  29,945  9  633  9  332  3  348  31,258  95.8
6400  Undertaking  2  942  1  3  1  _  I  1  946  99.6
All Above Measures?  733  68,603  150  2,746  136  1,099  137  1,321  73,122  93.9
The United States has also employed two additional discriminatory trade measures, namely, voluntary price restraints  (primarily against Republic of Korea)
and countervailing duty investigations. Neither of these two measures has been used against Japan, Germany,  France or the United Kingdom.
2  The totals recorded  in this row may involve some double counting of discriminatory barriers if two or more of these measures are applied to the same tariff
line product.  For this reason one should not attempt to relate the value  figures shown above to total trade in order to derive an NTB 'coverage  ratio'.
Source:  Authors'  tabulations using the UNCTAD  Data Base on Trade Control Measures and the World Bank SMART system.19
Box 3
Definitions  of High Technoloev  Industries  and Trade
High-tech products are usually defined as products for which investment in the creation of
knowledge  are responsible  for a substantial  share of their production  costs (Krugman 1987).  As Kreinin  (1987)
points out, to define a high-tech  sector in terms of its factor inputs -- e.g.,  the relative intensity of research and
development  (R & D) investments,  or the proportion  of scientists  and engineers  in the labor force -- does not allow
one to discriminate  between  industries  characterized  by different  rates of technological  diffusion. These indicators,
by being static in nature, reflect the prevailing  situation  at a given point in time and may provide  a distorted  picture
as time goes by as some industries  become  less active in technological  terms, while new high-tech  sectors evolve.
Most  of the relevant  literature,  however,  uses some variation  of the input  criteria in defining  high-
tech industries. The better known  high-tech  definitions  are reviewed  in Hatter (1985). We adopted  the definition
proposed by Davis (1982), which estimates  the technology  intensity  for any given industry in the United States in
terms of the R&D expenditures  required to produce a certain manufactured  good.  This methodology  takes into
account  not only the direct R&D investments  made  by final  producers,  but also the indirect  R&D expenditures  made
by suppliers  of intermediate  goods used in the production  of the final good. The "indirect' R&D contribution  was
estimated  by Davis using input-output  techniques. Based  on the United States Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC), industries  were ranked according to their R&D intensity  and the first ten SIC groups (3-digit  classification
) were designated  as high-tech  industries. The industry  ranked  as number  ten had an R&D index 30 percent greater
than the industry  in eleventh place and more than 100 percent above the average for the manufacturing  sector as
a whole. In other words, Davis' methodology  imposes  a much higher standard in terms of R&D intensity  than the
'above average level' criteria often adopted  in the literature.
In order to translate  Davis' industry  classification  into a definition  of high-tech  trade, we used the
concordance  between  the SIC grouping  and the SITC Revision 1 classification  proposed by Hatter (1985). Given
the imperfect  match between  SIC and SITC codes, Hatter estimated  high-tech  weights  (the proportion of US high-
tech imports  and exports in each given SITC group, based on 1975-1977  US trade data ) as a way to highlight  the
relative  importance  of high-tech  products in any given SITC grouping. In preparing our data on high-tech  trade,
we considered  only those SITC groups (at 4-digit level)  which presented  a high-tech  weight  greater  or equal to 50
percent. Annex tables  in this report identify individual  hi-tech  products and also provide statistics  on their trade.
It is worth mentioning  that the appropriateness  of this methodology  relies on the assumption  that
the use of United States input-output  relations and trade patterns for high-tech  production  does not introduce a
perverse bias in the classification.20
and development,  competition,  and foreign  direct investment  policies, as well as financial  market regulation  -- at
OECD level as a means to promote  policy-convergence  over the long-run  (Ostry 1990; 1991). Such an initiative
clearly reflects a  desire to create a fix-rule multilateral  regime for high-tech industries in order to avoid the
proliferation  of managed  trade initiatives,  but the prospects  of such a code being implemented  in the near future
seem dim at best.2?
V. Final Comments
Managed  trade initiatives  seems to pose a larger threat to the multilateral  trade system  in a post-
Uruguay  Round world than new preferential  trading blocs.  High-tech  trade will probably provide the main points
of conflict  between OECD countries. Accordingly,  a growing  resort to managed  trade solutions  appears likely.
Such a development,  in turn, may increase  the danger of trading  blocs turning hostile to each other.
If events  proceed along these  lines, developing  countries  may have to deal with some unpleasant
realities in the 1990s. It is doubtful that minilateralism  will be rolled back from its current high profile as far as
trade flows are concerned.  On the other hand, a further major expansion  of minilateral  arrangements  among
industrialized  countries  - beyond the arrangements  identified  in Table 1 - does not seem  to be an immediate  threat.
Managed  trade practices,  however, will continue  to add strain to the frail multilateral  trade system  built around  the
GATT, fostering  a power-based  system  of international  economic  relations. It is improbable,  to say the least, that
developing  countries could benefit  from such development.
23  It is also worth remembering  that a much more immediate  threat to the multilateral  system  remains  at large
in thl context of an eventual 'failure' or unsatisfactory  conclusion  of the Uruguay  Round negotiations  (Primo  Braga
1991). Against this background,  the proliferation  of country  specific discriminatory  trade-management  initiatives
(i.e, VERS, etc.) for high-tech  trade seems even more probable.Table 5.  Trends  in United States Expotts of High-Tech Products to Selected Markets: 1965 to  1989
High Technolory  Expon Facts  1965  1975  1985  1987  1989
Destination of U.S.  Exports (Smillion)
Argentina/Brazil/Chile  139  971  1,601  2,459  2,976 European Comnunity'  1,434  5,888  18,544  23,481  36,163 Developing South and SE Asia  338  2,063  10,191  13,008  20,083 Japan  324  1,406  6,114  8,019  12,378 World  4,778  21,951  63,368  78,384  110,367
U.S.  Hiuh-Tech Trade Balance (Smillion)
ArgentinatBraziUChile  135  883  720  1,295  1,723 European Community  844  3,452  5,968  7,986  17,199 Developing South and SE  Asia  300  597  -2,714  -6,878  -8,096 Japan  -101  -1,219  -18,668  -22,186  -24,313 World  3,182  12,059  -2,707  -5,258  -,444
Hi-Tech Trade Balance As a Share of U.S. High-Tech Exports (%)
Argentina/BraziUChile  97  91  45  53  58 European Commnunity  58  59  32  34  47 Developing South and SE Asia  89  29  -27  -53  -40 Japan  -31  -87  -305  -276  -196 World  66  55  4  -7  2
Hi-Tech Goods as a Share of All U.S.  Exports (%)
Argentina/BrazilUChile  17  24  36  43  43 European Conmmunity  21  26  43  44  47 Developing South and SE Asia  13  21  38  39  37 Japan  16  15  28  29  29 World
MEMO  rTEM: EEC Hi- Tech Trade Performnance
Hi-Tech Exportsto  Japan (Smillion)  108  612  1,678  3,112  3,926 Hi-Tech Trade Balance with Japan ($million)  22  -1,024  -8,064  -14,615  -18,88S Hi-Tech Balan^e as a Share of Hi-Tech Exports  -20  -196  480  -470  -476 Hi-Tech Goods as a Share of All Exports  21  22  22  20  18
The 13 percentage point increase over  1987-89 is largely due to a $5 billion upsurge in United States aircraft cxports.22
Annex
List of Major Regional Integration Arrangements
Andean Pact  Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,  Peru, Venezuela.
ASEAN  Association  of South East Asian Nations (Brunei,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Philippines,  Singapore,
Thailand).
CACM  Central American Common Market (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,  Nicaragua).
CARICOM  Caribbean  Common  Market  (Antigua  and  Barbuda,  Barbados,  Belize,  Dominica,  Grenada,
Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat,  St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago).
EC  European  Conmmunities (Belgium,  Denmark,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,
Luxembourg,  Netherlands, Portugal,  Spain,  United Kingdom).
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia,  Mali,  Mauritania,  Niger,  Nigeria,  Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Togo).
EFTA  European Free Trade Association (Austria, Finland,  Iceland, Norway,  Sweden, Switzerland).
EC-EFTA  A protocol allows for free trade  in manufactured goods between these two trading blocks.  An
agreement for the creation of an European Economic Area (EEA) is being negotiated.
GCC  Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates).
LAIA  Latin American  Integration Association (Argentina,  Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,  Colombia, Ecuador,
Mexico,  Paraguay,  Peru, Uruguay,  Venezuela).
Maghreb Arab  Maghreb Union (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania,  Morocco, Tunisia).
MERCOSUR  South Cone's  Common Market (Argeuitina, Brazil, Paraguay,  Uruguay)
SADCC-PTA  South  African  Development  Coordination  Conference  (Angola,  Botswana,  Lesotho,  Mali,
Mozambique,  Swaziland, Tanzania,  Zambia, Zimbabwe) and Preferential Trade Area of Eastern
and  Southerm African  States  (members  of  SADCC,  minus  Angola,  plus  Burundi,  Comoros,
Ethiopia,  Kenya, Mauritius,  Rwanda,  Somalia).
UDEAC  Central  African Customs  and  Economic  Union (Cameroon,  Central  African  Republic,  Chad,
Congo,  Equatorial Guinea, Gabon).23
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ATd
Sttsis  n  aemtooTad  nHghTcnloyPouAppendix  Table 1.  The Relative  Importance  and Major Sources  of High-Tech  Products  in Global  Trade
Hi-Tech  Goods  Originating  in:
of which:
Share of Hi-Tech  in  All Hi-Tech  Industrial  Other
Year  world trade (%)  good  Countries  USA  japEC(0E  EFTA  Countries
(Value  of exports in terms of $US million)
1965  10  17  17  5  1  9  2  -
1970  14  38  36  10  4  18  2  2
1975  12  94  88  22  10  45  6  6
1980  13  233  211  51  30  106  13  22
1985  19  296  269  63  53  114  15  27
1987  20  432  372  78  76  175  25  60  -
1989  22  557  479  110  97  218  31  78
(Share  of Hi-tech  trade  originating  in different  regions - (%)
1965  - 100  100  29  6  53  6  -
1970  - 100  95  26  10  47  5  8
1975  - 100  94  23  11  48  6  6
1980  - 100  91  22  13  45  6  9
1985  - 100  88  21  18  38  5  9
1987  - 100  86  18  18  40  6  14
1989  - 100  86  20  18  39  6  14
Source: Based  on data derived  from the UNSO  Comtrade  Data Base.  The failure  of some countries  to report trade statistics  to the United  Nations  may cause
the value of trade in hi-tech  products  to be misstated.28
Aovendix Tablo 2.  The Origin and Destination of High Tech Trade  in 1988
of,di  of  Wh
__O_  au  M  Soth  EDst  EasteS  Not
2WEd  b*AW  Eg U12)  EFfA  Amui  *b  1MecIA  A  is  AIa  Otb-  E-
(valm of ad  etin  W.  of tuY mIlt)
Wodd  507.5  372.6  204.9  32.4  103.2  18.4  114.7  18.8  5.5  64.6  25S  8.8  20.2
ldtigla  Coald"  445.4  334.0  192.7  31.2  825  15.3  93.9  17.1  4.1  49.1  23.6  6.8  17.5 EEC(12)  210.7  171.7  120.8  21.3  21.2  4.0  27.7  3.3  1.8  8.1  14.5  4.5  11.3
EFIA  30.0  24.3  16.4  3.8  2.7  0.8  3.8  0.6  0.2  1.0  1.9  1.3  1.9
Nath  A  I  I  110.5  73.6  32.8  3.6  22.3  10.4  33.7  11.1  1.2  16.4  5.0  0.2  3.2 l1  928  63.6  22.3  2.5  36.0  0.0  28.2  2.0  0.9  23.1  2.2  0.8  1.0 DswkIf  Ctb  60.8  38.3  12.0  1.1  20.6  3.1  20.6  1.7  1.3  15.4  2.2  1.2  1.9
Laa1  Azind  ad  Cuibbosn  4.8  3.1  0.8  0.1  1.9  0.1  1.7  1.2  - 0.3  0.1  - 0.0
S  S  As  0.9  0.3  0.2  - 0.1  - 0.3  - - 0.1  0.1  0.3  0.0
Eat  Ads  49.3  32.3  9.4  0.8  17.8  2.9  16.8  0.3  0.8  14.6  1.0  0.2  0.2
Odta  5.7  2.8  1.6  0.1  0.9  0.1  1.9  0.2  0.5  0.3  0.9  0.6  1.0
(&mem  of Uast  to dilffma  dkallmc  *  pterm)
Wosd  IOD  73  40  6  20  4  23  4  1  13  5  2  4
h  lhm1  Cawudl  100  75  43  7  19  3  21  4  1  11  5  2  4
EC(12)  100  81  57  10  10  2  13  2  1  4  7  2  6
DFA  IOD  81  55  13  9  3  13  2  1  3  6  4  6
Noth  Anisso  100  67  30  3  20  9  30  10  I  IS  5  - 3
jlp  100  69  24  3  39  0  31  2  1  25  2  1  1 Dbilog  Ceairb  100  03  20  2  34  5  34  3  2  25  4  2  3
LatI  Amead  C&rIm  100  65  17  2  40  2  35  25  - 6  2  - 0 ScAbAa  100  34  22  - 11  - 33  - - II  I 1  33  0
Ent Ask  10  66  19  2  36  6  34  1  2  30  2  - -
Odom  IOD  49  28  2  16  2  33  4  9  5  16  11  18
S;:  UNSO Cumtab  Date Bas.29
Appendix Table 3.  The Twenty-Five Largest Exporters of High Tech Manufactured Goods
Trade balance (Smillion)  Share of world exports (%)  Value of exnorto (Smillion)
Exrter  1968  1978  1988  1968  1978  1988  1968  1978  1988
United States  3,891  12,130  8,716  29.2  21.2  18.5  7,413  31,882  94,734
Japan  1,417  16,454  71,315  8.5  13.7  17.5  2,173  20,607  89,694
Germany, Fed.  1,969  6,752  9,170  14.9  14.0  10.8  3,768  21,017  55,499
France  46  -124  -1,296  6.6  6.9  6.6  1,684  10,458  34,009
United Kingdom  1,132  2,812  -5,669  9.5  7.8  6.3  2,415  11,736  32,007
Netherlands  38  -110  -2,861  5.1  4.7  3.9  1,287  7,090  19,827
Taiwan, (China)  -104  873  7,623  0.4  1.7  3.2  99  2,563  16,595
Italy  161  -307  -6,803  4.5  3.7  3.2  1,148  5,609  16,247
Rep. of Korea  -176  -584  4,263  0.1  1.0  2.9  17  1,544  14,682
Belgium-Luxembourg  -55  -221  -1,209  2.9  3.5  2.7  730  5,219  13,954
Canada  -610  -1,453  -3,437  4.3  2.9  2.7  1,087  4,423  13,717
Singapore  -103  -570  1,697  0.1  0.9  2.4  16  1,380  12,531
Switzerland  -27  847  -70  2.8  2.7  1.9  704  4,018  9,692
Hong Kong  -151  -698  -5,004  0.6  0.9  1.6  148  1,392  8,369
Sweden  -273  -405  -1,027  1.9  1.7  1.5  480  2,581  7,589
Mexico  -355  -443  804  0.4  0.9  1.4  96  1,339  7,112
Malaysia  -51  -293  770  - 0.6  1.2  3  885  6,044
Austria  -591  -1,354  -5,566  0.7  1.1  1.1  170  1,585  5,874
Ireland  -75  -140  1,477  0.3  0.6  1.1  67  844  5,618
China  45  -262  -2,570  0.2  0.2  1.1  41  262  5,394
Spain  -310  -1,039  -7,041  0.4  0.7  0.8  100  1,034  4,020
Denmark  -203  -845  -1,420  0.8  0.7  0.7  194  1,119  3,486
Brazil  -389  -1,318  -1,001  0.1  0.5  0.6  26  728  3,106
Australia  -592  -1,355  -5,566  0.5  0.8  0.6  123  1,218  2,978
Thailand  -152  -598  -1,330  - 0.1  0.,4  2  214  1,941
All above countries  4,482  27,749  56,533  94.6  93.5  94.7  23,991  140,747  484,719
World  --  - - 100.0  100.0  100.0  25,349  150,569  511,886
Source:  UNSO Comtrade Data Base.A*ienix  Table 4.  The Relative Inporance  of Individual Products in All High Tech Global Exports
Share in All Hi-Tech
Product Exports (%)  Value of exports  in $ million
SITC  Descriotion  1968  1988  1968  1973  1978  1983  1987  1988
714  Office Machinery  8.6  18.4  2,279  7,235  15,071  34,408  77,857  93,168
724  Telecommunications Apparatus  12.3  1  1.5  3,246  9,568  22,741  30,972  53,094  58,363
861  Scientific Instruments  9.0  9.4  2,393  6,112  14,754  20,773  35,859  47,673
729.3  Transistors, Photocell, etc.  3.1  8.7  819  3,987  8,458  17,838  33,997  44,288
734  Aircraft  13.5  7.9  3,558  6,298  14,079  24,831  32,633  39,967
581.2  Productsof  Polymerization  5.9  7.6  1,549  4,814  10,706  16,594  20,600  38,742
711.5  Internal CombustionEngines  7.4  5.6  1,963  4,661  11,367  15,119  24,028  28,425
541  Medicinal Products Excluding Phamnaceuticals  7.1  5.5  1,888  4,698  10,526  15,030  24,950  27,993
729.9  Electrical Machinery and Apparatus  3.2  3.5  847  2,590  6,421  8,323  15,165  17,836
891.1  Tape Recorders  2.8  3.1  743  1,983  3,843  9,995  16,742  15,768
581.1  Plastics and Products of Condensation  3.2  2.4  840  2,210  4,710  7,063  13,549  12,303
513  Inorganic Elements  3.8  2.3  1,000  2,585  5,823  8,596  10,435  11,468
711.4  Aircraft Engines  4.1  2.2  1,082  1,898  3,036  4,912  9,603  11,226
862  PhotographicSupplies  2.4  2.1  625  1,532  3,840  5,933  9,600  10,516
891.2  Recorders of Sound  0.8  1.9  206  642  1,756  4,168  8,716  9,794
651.6  Synthetic Fibers  4.7  1.7  1,231  3,559  4,884  5,973  9,387  8,800
514  Other Inorganic Chemicals  2.5  1.3  649  1,324  3,014  4,249  6,043  6,730
515  Radioactive Materials  0.3  1.0  85  489  3,005  3,971  5,348  5,192
711.6  Gas Turbines  0.5  0.5  139  417  2,240  3,805  4,307  5,002
533.1  Coloring Materials  0.6  0.5  162  387  742  1,016  2,265  2,620
541.9  Pharmaceutical Goods  0.3  0.4  85  215  564  884  1,754  2,268
651.7  Yarnand  Artificial Fibers  1.0  0.4  258  607  941  1,113  1,706  2,238
899.6  Orthopedic Appliances  0.2  0.4  43  148  532  811  1,349  1,998
561.3  Potassic Fertilizers  1.1  0.3  292  432  861  1,204  1,220  1,647
711.8  Engines, nes  0.4  0.3  113  274  540  815  1,198  1,468
711.3  Steam Engines  0.9  0.2  231  486  1,206  1,267  1,229  1,201
894.3  Nonmilitary Arms  0.2  0.1  61  158  239  241  323  333
571.4  Hunting and Sporting Ammunition  0.1  - 32  74  155  145  358  237
571.2  Fuses  and Detonators  - - 18  34  95  88  151  153
729.7  Electron Accelerators  _  - 12  15  37  52  77  84
Memo Item
Hi-Tech as a Share of All Manufactures Exports (%)  21.0  21.4  21.5  25.6  27.2  28.631
Appendix  Table 5.  Revealed  Comparative  Advantage  Indices  for the Twenty-Five  Largest
Exporters  of High-Tech  Manufactured  Goods
Exporter  1968  1978  1988
United States  1.56  1.56  1.59
Japan  1.05  1.16  1.33
Germany, Fed.  0.91  0.89  0.76
France  0.96  0.91  1.03
United Kingdom  1.00  1.10  1.19
Netherlands  1.37  1.27  1.15
Taiwan, (China)  0.98  1.05  1.01
Italy  0.74  0.59  0.55
Rep. of Korea  0.30  0.74  1.00
Belgium-Luxembourg  0.62  0.77  0.69
Canada  0.87  0.84  0.75
Singapore  0.49  2.07  2.23
Switzerland  1.05  0.86  0.75
Hong Kong  0.48  0.67  0.75
Sweden  0.70  0.75  0.69
Mexico'  1.53  1.73  1.34
Malaysia  0.37  2.35  1.98
Austria  0.63  0.82  0.84
Ireland  0.92  1.40  1.64
China  0.28  0.28  0.48
Spain  0.72  0.51  0.53
Denmark  0.84  0.82  0.78
Brazit  0.70  0.96  0.65
Australia  1.05  1.99  1.56
Thailand  0.27  0.98  0.85
Note:  The Revealed  Comparative  Advantage  (RCA) index is defined  as follows:
RCA..  =  (xi /X  )/(x.w/X.
where the w subscripts  indicate  world totals, t represents  all manufactured  goods, x. denotes  a certain category  of
manufactured  exports (in this case high-tech  goods), and  j is a country.  Values  above unity are taken to indicate
that the country has a comparative  advantage  in high-tech products.  The figures presented in this table were
calculated  by the authors based on the UNSO Comtrade  Data Base.
(a)  The data for Mexico  includes  the exports from the 'maquila' plants.Policy  Research Working  Paper Series
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